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The Death Drive
The theory of the drives is so to say our mythology. Drives are mythical entities, 
magnificent in their indefiniteness. In our work we cannot for a moment disregard them, 
yet we are never sure that we are seeing them clearly…Actually what we are talking 
now is biological psychology, we are studying the psychical accompaniments of 
biological processes….(Freud, New Introductory Lectures, SE XXII, 97)
As the above quotation indicates, Freud’s thinking about the notion of a Trieb (drive or instinct) was 
marked by two features. The first was an empirical tentativeness, which shows in his speaking of 
these particular theoretical entities as mythical, or again, as elsewhere, particularly capable of 
modification or replacement in the light of experience. The second was a remarkable empirical scope. 
In his consideration of the drives he was conducting a particularly far-reaching kind of investigation, 
which he called biological psychology, and which was the first sustained version of what has become 
two families of disciplines. 
In its modes of thinking and argument, and in many of its conclusions, Freud’s biological psychology 
encompassed what is now called physiological psychology, including computational, cognitive, and 
affective neuroscience; and also what is now called evolutionary psychology, which seeks to relate 
these disciplines to the evolutionary function and history of brain and mind. The scope of Freud’s 
enquiry thus partly explains the tentativeness of his conclusions. Insofar as we are seeking integrate 
psychology with both neuroscience and evolutionary biology, our conclusions are liable to uncertainty 
from many directions. 
1. The concept of a drive and its overall role. 
Freud’s use of the notion of a drive, including his postulation of the death drive, was meant to serve 
two connected purposes. The first was that of explaining certain psychological phenomena. The 
second, and that responsible for this combination of scope and hesitation, was that of overall 
explanatory unification. This was the task of understanding the mind as part of the natural and 
physical world. 
The notion of a drive serves to accomplish these tasks together. The concept is introduced at the 
point at which a family of activities, and the motives upon which they depend, have been traced to 
their most basic psychological roots. Here further understanding of the whole family can be achieved 
only in physiological or biological terms. If we can achieve such understanding we therefore locate the 
whole family of motives in relation to their physiological basis and its biological functions, and hence 
in relation to the physical sciences more generally. To see the mind in terms of drives, therefore, is to 
see the mind in its place in nature. 
2. The concept is based in everyday psychological explanation by reference to motive. 
This general idea, in turn, can be seen as drawing on the overall structure of commonsense 
psychological explanation, which is partly shared by psychoanalysis. In this structure we explain 
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actions by motives, and these motives by prior motives, which we take to be deeper and more basic; 
and so on back. Thus we can trace a whole range of human activities -- including hunting, farming, 
foraging; the preserving and transporting of foodstuffs; the practices of cooking, distributing, and 
sharing food -- to motives explained by the desire to have food. Likewise we might trace another 
range of human activities -- those connected with making clothes, finding and constructing shelter, 
and so forth -- to the desire to keep the right degree of warmth (to keep the right body 
temperature). Something similar, again, would hold for the activities connected with having access to 
water. 
These vast and overlapping ranges of human activity can thus be traced to a few distinct 
psychological roots. For any of the activities in these ranges, if we ask why people are engaged in 
that activity, the answer will always ultimately be traceable back to the fact that people want food 
and water, and clothes and shelter which enable them to keep warm enough. (These things may be 
connected with other motives as well, since food, clothing, and houses can also be used for such 
purposes as display and courting; but we will come to that.) These basic wants for material resources 
we can in turn trace to our recurring desires to eat or drink, to be warmer or cooler, to avoid hunger, 
thirst, the discomforts of exposure, and so on. When we reach this point, however, we seem to have 
exhausted our capacity to explain things in terms of desire or feeling. For there seem no further or 
more basic desires or feelings to cite, except perhaps the desire to stay alive. 
3. The concept serves to carry explanation below the level of motive, to that of physiological 
mechanism and biological function. The concept marks the place where the explanatory task of 
psychological thinking is continued, but in non-psychological terms. It thus provides a bridge, or 
crossing of the frontier, between psychology and the physical sciences. 
Any further explanation of any of these vast complexes of activity therefore requires us to go below 
the level of desire or feeling, to that of the physiological states or mechanisms which we take to give 
rise to them. There is a straightforward way to do this. We can hypothesize that desires to eat, 
feelings of hunger, and so forth, are manifestations of a drive, which is realized in the brain and which 
functions to provide the body with nutrition. Similarly we can hypothesize that there is a which 
functions to provide the body with water, and likewise one which functions to keep body temperature 
within certain limits. On such an account there will be a drive related to the desires at the root of 
each psychological family we have traced back in this way, and each drive will reflect the functioning 
of a physiological system, which subserves basic bodily or biological needs. 
Thus although our capacity for motivational psychological explanation runs out when we reach certain 
basic desires, this is consistent with our still being able to continue with explanation. Such 
explanation is no longer psychological; but since it concerns the physiological processes at the source 
of the most basic motives it is nonetheless still relevant to psychological understanding. In tracing 
the roots of motive below the psychological level we must perforce make use of concepts or 
descriptions which are physiological or biological. At this point in explanation, therefore, the notion of 
a drive comes into play, as Freud says, as ‘the concept of the frontier-line, between the somatic and 
the mental’ (XII, 74). Hence, as he also says, ‘Drives and their transformations are at the limit of 
what is discernible by psycho-analysis. From that point it gives place to biological research.’ (XI, 136) 
But then the concept of a drive is precisely the notion which enables us to cross this frontier, and to 
start to integrate psychology with physiology and biology. 
4. This involves consideration of two large philosophical topics: the relation of the mental and the 
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physical (‘the somatic and the mental’); and the relation of distinct explanatory discourses (on the 
one hand that of motivational psychology, including psychoanalysis; and on the other those of 
physiology and biology, including neuroscience.) 
Consideration of the notion of a drive, and with it the integration of psychology with physiology, thus 
involves two large philosophical topics. The first is the relation of the mental and the physical 
generally. The second is the relation of the distinct explanatory discourses whose integration we are 
considering. In this case the discourses are those of motivational psychology, including 
psychoanalysis, and those of physiology and biology (including neuroscience) to which the notion of a 
drive is meant to provide a bridge. Clearly we cannot discuss these topics in full here, but we can gain 
a useful perspective on them as follows. 
(a) In speaking in connection with drives of the level below that of motive we use the idea of levels 
of description. We can describe reality, including human motive, in a series of different ways, each of 
which provides a basis for the one preceding it. The deepest levels in this series appear to be those 
of the physical sciences, particularly chemistry and physics. 
In speaking here of the physiological or biological level as below that of motive we are making use of 
the notion of levels of description. The idea is that we can describe reality -- including human motives 
and their realization in the brain -- in a number of different ways, depending upon our explanatory 
purposes; and that these descriptions can (in principle) be arranged in a series, each of which would 
provide a basis of application for those prior to it. 
Thus consider everyday objects like cups, forks, watches, and so on. The idea is that as well as 
describing these things in such everyday terms, we could describe them in further ways, such as in 
terms of their parts and the way they were put together and the materials of which they are made. 
Thus we might describe a particular cup, for example, as a piece of a particular kind of ceramic with a 
certain shape. This further description would in a sense provide a basis for the prior description as a 
cup, for if something were a piece of ceramic of this same kind and shape, that thing would also be a 
cup. So we might speak of the level at which we described the shape and materials which made up 
the cup as a level below that of the everyday description in We might go further, and describe the 
ceramic in terms of the chemical kinds of which it was composed, and the same would hold: 
something of those chemical kinds, in that arrangement, would be a cup. And so on, if we were to 
describe the cup in terms of physics, that is, in terms of the molecules of which it was composed, 
and so forth. This would be the deepest level of description, which (in principle at least) would 
provide a basis for each of the higher ones in turn. 
Like many today, Freud assumed that this held for human beings as well. Thus we could describe a 
person as having certain beliefs, desires, thoughts, feelings, and so on, and this would constitute one 
level of description, which psychoanalysis has considerably extended. Then also, in principle at least, 
we could describe the mechanisms in that person’s body and brain which realized these beliefs, 
desires, thoughts, feelings, phantasies, and the like. This would be another level of description, which 
would provide a basis for the first; and beneath this would be the cellular level, the biochemical level, 
and so on. So Freud says, for example, ‘for the psychical field, the biological field does in fact play 
the part of the underlying bedrock’ (XXIII, 252); and again that ‘…all our provisional ideas in 
psychology will some day be based on an organic sub-structure.’ (XIV, 78) 
(b) As an adherent of the rigorously physicalistic ‘school of Helmholtz’ Freud held that descriptions 
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at the physiological or chemical level might actually replace those of psychology. 
Freud was educated in the rigorously physicalistic ‘school of Helmholtz,’ named after the great 
German scientist of the time, whose contributions ranged from neurophysiology through fundamental 
physics. Freud’s mentor Bruke -- whose piercing glance Freud recalled in his ‘Non-Vixit’ dream -- was 
a leading figure in this school, whose ‘oath’ was as follows: 
Bruke and I pledged a solemn oath to put into power this truth: no other forces than 
the common physical-chemical ones are active within the organism. In those cases 
which cannot at the time be explained by these forces one has either to find the 
specific way or form of their action by means of the physical-mathematical method, or 
to assume new forces equal in dignity to the chemical-physical forces inherent in 
matter, reducible to the force of attraction and repulsion.
As we shall see, there is reason to think that this goal of finding physical forces ‘equal in dignity’ to 
‘the force of attraction and repulsion’ was to prove important to Freud. And in accord with this 
physicalistic line of thought he seems to have held not just that the physiological or neurological level 
of description was basic to psychology, but also that once we attained this level of description, we 
might use it to replace that of psychology. Thus he seems to have held that we could regard certain 
psychological descriptions or hypotheses as ‘substitutes’ for physiological or chemical ones which we 
were as yet unable to formulate. For example he took it to be 
probable that special substances and special chemical processes control the operation 
of sexuality and provide for the continuation of the individual life in that of the species. 
We take this probability into account when we substitute special forces in the mind for 
special chemical processes. (XIV, 79)
And in accord with this view he stresses that ‘The deficiencies on our description would probably 
vanish if we were already in a position to replace the psychological terms by physiological or chemical 
ones.’ (XVIII, 60). 
(c) By contemporary philosophical standards, however, this view seems too reductive. We can 
acknowledge different levels of description without holding that higher levels reduce to lower levels, 
and this conceptual pluralism seems a more realistic view. 
Freud’s view here anticipates the role of specialized hormones and neurotransmitters in regulating 
sexual and parental motivation. Still in speaking of psychology as substituting ‘special forces in the 
mind’ for ‘special chemical processes’, or again of ‘replacing psychological terms by physiological or 
chemical ones’ Freud suggests a view that by contemporary standards is unduly reductive. 
Philosophical discussions of this question over the last thirty years have stressed that accepting the 
idea that the level of psychological description can be seen as based on that of physiological 
description does not entail accepting that the psychological level of description is in any sense 
replaceable. Rather the tendency has been to acknowledge that it is very rarely the case that 
descriptions or explanations at one level can actually be replaced by those at another, and that this 
holds with particular clarity for the descriptions and explanations of motivational psychology. So in 
particular the basic role of the brain does not entail that the concepts of psychology should be 
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replaced by other concepts describing the brain, or that the practices of commonsense or 
psychoanalytic explanation should yield to those of neuroscience or any other discipline. 
Although this view is characteristically buttressed by complex philosophical arguments the gist of it is 
straightforward and easy to understand. When we actually consider our descriptive and explanatory 
practices we find that they enable us to understand and order things, to relate them to other things 
that we are familiar with or have theoretical or practical knowledge about, in many distinct ways. 
Each explanatory practice has its own vocabulary and priorities in explanation; and these distinct 
priorities characteristically require that the terms or concepts of one discipline do not strictly match 
those of another. This is particularly clear in the case of psychology via-a-vis the brain, it also holds in 
other areas which are simpler. 
Thus consider the concept of a cup. Most people would probably be prepared to be physicalists about 
cups, in that we have no difficulty in accepting that every cup (every drinking cup, tea cup, trophy 
cup, bra cup, protector cup, etc.) is a physical and chemical thing of one kind or another. Still we can 
also see that it would be hopeless to try to reduce the concept of cup to the concepts of physics or 
chemistry, or to try to replace the concept of a cup in our thinking by concepts from these 
disciplines. The concept cannot be defined in physical or chemical terms, because cups can be made 
in countless ways from countless kinds of materials, so that any attempted definition would either 
leave out many cups or include many things that were not cups. And clearly in thinking about cups in 
terms of physics or chemistry we would risk losing our sense of what cups are for, since this is no 
part of those sciences. So the fact that every cup is a physical and chemical object does not tend to 
make it possible to replace the idea or concept or notion of a cup (or of the word ‘cup’) by those of 
physical science. 
Something similar holds for desires and other psychological entities. Even if we suppose that every 
desire is realized by some sort of physiological mechanism in the brain of the person who has the 
desire, still we can see that it would be hopeless to try to reduce the concept of desire to the 
concepts of physiology, or to try to replace this concept with others from neuroscience, as Freud 
seems to have had in mind. In thinking of desires, belief, and other motives we do not merely think of 
mechanisms in the individual who has them, we also think of how that individual is embedded in, and 
related to, the world. Every desire, wish, or phantasy, for example, is a desire, wish, or phantasy that 
such and such be the case, where this relates to the world in which the desiring subject is embedded. 
This relatedness to the world is built directly in to our concepts of belief, desire, and other motives, 
in a way in which it is not built in to the concepts of physiology or neuroscience. 
In consequence just as trying to use concepts of physics or chemistry in place of the concept cup 
would in effect deprive us of our understanding of what cups are, so trying to use concepts of 
neuroscience in place of concepts like desire and belief would deprive us of our sense of how 
motivated persons are related to the world which gives meaning to their actions. So even if we were 
to accept physicalistic monism -- the view that all objects and events are ultimately physical objects 
and events -- we should still maintain a conceptual pluralism, which would maintain the distinctness 
and significance of the many forms of understanding of the world which we frame in terms other than 
those of the physical sciences. 
(d) Even fundamental unification in the physical sciences need not produce reduction of this kind. 
Rather higher levels of description are linked with more basic ones in a piecemeal and case-by-case 
way. The example of contemporary biology. 
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To see more about the limits of reductionism it may be worth taking an example from the physical 
sciences themselves. One of the most striking scientific achievements of our time is the unification of 
evolutionary biology, which stems from the work of Darwin, with the genetic study of heredity, which 
stems from the work of Mendel. Darwin discussed evolution in terms of the way offspring tend to 
resemble their parents, albeit with variation; and both the resemblance and the variation were crucial 
to his theory. Mendel began to see that hereditary resemblance could be understood in terms of 
‘particles’ carried in the seeds and distributed among offspring in regular ways. As is well known, 
Mendel’s particles of inheritance came to be called the genes, and these were later located in the 
chromosomes of cells and found to be composed of molecules of DNA. 
This is a particularly clear case of the unification of previously disparate physical sciences. On the one 
hand it provides very powerful grounds for accepting Darwin’s general account of evolution. It seems 
that the only explanation we can frame for the fact that all plants and animals have virtually the 
same basic hereditary molecules at the core of their cells is that -- as Darwin claimed -- they are all 
descended from a few common ancestors. On the other, it has meant that these hereditary 
molecules could be investigated chemically. The molecules could be sequenced, cultured, snipped, re-
assembled, and so on, with the results that we are beginning to see today. 
Yet despite this very thorough scientific unification, it has not in fact been possible to reduce or 
replace the Mendelian description of the gene as the vehicle of inheritance, as this is actually used by 
evolutionary biologists, with any of the more precise and particular descriptions of the gene as 
portion of the DNA, which have emerged in molecular biology. Despite the fact that both evolutionary 
biologists and molecular biologists use the one word ‘gene’, and also accept the same scientific 
theories about genes, the physiological units which correspond to the evolutionary use of ‘gene’ do 
not coincide one-to-one with any particular molecular unit which has been devised or which is likely to 
be devised. 
This is a consequence of the different explanatory priorities of these different areas of biology. In 
trying to explain the passing of characteristics from generation to generation it is necessary to take 
account of many cellular and biological mechanisms beyond the DNA molecules themselves, and so to 
think in terms of units which are located and specified via their overall role in reproduction and 
inheritance rather than in specific molecular terms. The relation of DNA molecules to inherited 
characteristics is highly complex; and what is required for such inheritance encompasses more than 
DNA itself. So the ‘particles of inheritance’ cannot be specified solely in these terms. 
This constitutes no mystery for the scientists concerned. As long as investigators have differing 
explanatory aims they are liable to need to use different explanatory concepts, and hence concepts 
which are not precisely equivalent. This does not mean that different disciplines are providing 
descriptions of different realms of being, or even descriptions which cannot both be true in the same 
realm. They are describing the same world, but doing so in different ways, as is appropriate to 
distinct but compatible explanatory aims. 
5. In marking the place where the explanatory work of our system of psychological descriptions is 
continued, but in other terms, the concept of a drive carries two requirements. First, there must be 
an underlying order in psychological explanation, through which various motives can be traced back 
to a common source; and secondly this source must have a unified basis in physiological and 
biological organization. 
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The application of the notion of a drive thus presupposes both an order in the psychological 
phenomena to which it is related, and an order in the physiological or biological phenomena which 
underlie the psychological ones. The psychological phenomena really must admit of explanation which 
unifies them by representing them as derived from a distinct set of basic motives, such as the 
desires for food, drink, or comfortable temperature considered above. These basic desires, in turn, 
must stem from distinguishable physiological systems, which subserve distinct biological functions. 
These are both very strong requirements. In supposing that certain phenomena are related to a drive, 
and hence that they constitute a unified psychological family with a unified physiological basis, we 
are assuming that the categories of our interpretive psychology will prove to home in on the same 
underlying behaviour-governing mechanisms as those of physiology and evolutionary biology. We may 
be right to think that this is so; but it can be demonstrated only by a genuine and far-reaching 
explanatory co-ordination between psychology, physiology, and biology. This, indeed, is the kind of 
co-ordination which Freud’s use of the concept of a drive was intended to anticipate and facilitate. 
6. Drives will be realized by physiological mechanisms which have biological functions, and these can 
be understood in terms of evolution. 
A drive conceived on this model will have a biological function, and this will be effected by 
physiological structures or mechanisms, which work via the nervous system. Thus the function of the 
nutritive drive, say, will be to provide the body with nutrients, and thereby to sustain life; and this will 
be effected by mechanisms which detect lacks of the appropriate substances and prompt activities 
which remedy this. Something similar will hold for thirst. Again, the theromoregulative drive will 
function to keep body temperature within certain limits, and this will be effected by mechanisms 
which are sensitive to temperature and prompt people to actions which affect it. 
These drive-related mechanisms and functions, in turn, will be understood in terms of evolution. The 
physiological mechanisms which govern the desires to eat, drink, and stay at a satisfactory 
temperature will have developed and been saved in the course of evolution in virtue of their roles in 
sustaining the lives (and thereby facilitating the reproduction) of the creatures who have them; and 
in specifying these life-sustaining roles we specify their biological or evolutionary functions. These 
functions, in turn, will be passed on to the further mechanisms which are recruited for these roles 
through learning and experience. Thus a desire to eat this bacon sandwich now will arise on a 
particular occasion as a result of learning and experience in a particular culture. Still, considered as a 
manifestation of the nutritive drive, this desire will have been produced by mechanisms which 
evolved long before there was culture, or bacon sandwiches, for it to be exercised upon. The new 
desire, as fitted to the present occasion, is nonetheless also a manifestation of a function which is 
biologically ancient. 
On this kind of account biological function is inseparable from evolutionary function, and hence from 
evolutionary history. It is unclear how far Freud understood the notion in this way, but taking the 
notion as having this unambiguous sense will enable us to get a clearer perspective on the issues 
involved. Before Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection there was no satisfactory answer to 
questions as to why living things have the features that they do. One might ask, for example, why 
the whale was so like land-dwelling mammals on the one hand, and so like sea-dwelling fish on the 
other. There was no answer to this, and indeed there was also no answer to the question why fish 
had the features they had, or land-dwelling mammals the features they had. One could describe the 
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features, and investigate their intricate order and working; but as to why they existed, no explanation 
could be given except that God had made things that way. 
Darwin’s account made these features intelligible by enabling us to see them as resulting from 
descent and adaptation. Thus it was possible understand why the whale was like both land mammals 
and fish, by seeing that it was descended from land mammals, and so was also a mammal, but also 
that it was adapted, like fish, to life in the sea. Such adaptation, in turn, could be understood as the 
result of natural selection. Living things reproduced themselves in particular environments, and with 
variations. Some variants had features which enabled them to have more offspring than others in a 
particular environment; and as this process was repeated these features became characteristic of the 
population there. 
A group or population of living things could thus change over generations in a way which no individual 
could change; and in this process the population could become more adapted to the environment, in 
the sense of having more and more features which had facilitated reproduction in it. There has also 
been a constant pressure for this kind of change, since by and large creatures start more offspring 
than their environment can support. Members of each population are therefore liable in effect to be 
in reproductive competition with one another, as regards which will reproduce successfully. Where 
populations are reproductively separated their development can take different courses; and radically 
differing developments are made possible by the continual underlying molecular variation in the 
genetic material itself. In this way biological structures and functions can be seen as structures and 
functions which are, or which once were, adaptive -- that is, which evolved and were maintained in 
virtue of their role in facilitating the reproduction of the things which had them. 
The biological functions of things which we can understand in this way are thus the functions we take 
them to have evolved for, that is, to have evolved in virtue of performing. In this sense we take the 
eyes to be for seeing, the eyeblink reflex to be for protecting the eyes, the teeth for chewing, the 
ears for hearing, the heart for pumping blood, the womb for carrying the foetus while it develops, the 
breast for feeding the infant once it is born, and so on and on. The same reasoning also applies, but 
in a more complicated way, to things which now have no function but once did (the human appendix, 
which once apparently served for the digestion of cellulose, or the hipbones of whales, which once 
served for walking, but in ancestors of whales rather than whales themselves), or to things which 
were once advantageous but are now deleterious (our appetites for sweets and fat, our tendencies 
to lethal aggression). 
We have no deep or systematic mode for understanding biological function besides this Darwinian 
one; and it is only features of this (once- or now-) adaptive kind, or others which for one reason or 
another go with them, which we can understand in this way. So insofar as we cannot understand 
features in this way (as might be the case with homosexuality, for example), they remain biologically 
mysterious. As we shall see, this applies particularly to the death drive as Freud described it. 
7. These requirements of the concept of a drive are reflected in psychoanalytic controversies about 
the notion. 
We thus see that the concept of a drive is a complex and far-reaching one, in the use of which we are 
required to bear in mind considerations relating psychology, physiology, and biological (and hence 
evolutionary) function. Focussing on these distinct considerations enables us to start to attain an 
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overall picture of what is at issue in psychoanalytic disputes about drives. 
Many analysts decline to use the notion of a drive at all, because they do not want to commit 
themselves to biological or physiological claims as well as psychological ones; and since the point of 
the notion is indeed to connect psychology with these other sciences, this is a reasonable response. 
Again, many analysts reject the notion because they do not think that the explanatory unifications 
that have been achieved by psychoanalysis so far are really so full or clear as to warrant use of the 
notion; and they are right to think that this is something which requires to be shown. By contrast, 
many who use the notion do so because they take it to mark a genuine explanatory unification, at 
least at the psychological level; and this is a claim which can be given empirical support. And finally, 
many advocate the use of the notion because they wish to continue the project of unifying 
psychology with the natural sciences as this was marked out by Freud; and this is surely a worthy 
aim. Such arguments thus all reflect distinct but reasonable lines of thought, based in the project and 
requirements implicit in the notion of a drive. 
8. How Freud sought to meet these requirements in psycho-analysis: 
(a) the emotions and sexuality, in the context of a Darwinian understanding of 
evolution.
We have seen that the concept of a drive requires an explanatory rooting for a family of motives, 
which is underlain by a distinctive family of physiological mechanisms. We can find at least the 
beginnings of this kind of psycho-physiological correlation in both commonsense and psychoanalytic 
thinking about the emotions. We speak of behaviour as arising not only from bodily needs such as 
hunger and thirst, but also from a range of emotions, such as fear, anger, love, hate, envy, and guilt. 
(And of course the thwarting of the drives which secures the bodily needs can trigger the most 
overwhelming emotions -- such as terror, rage, and panic -- that we are capable of feeling.) We also 
think of each of these emotions as giving rise to recognizable and specific patterns of desire and 
other motives, and as likely to be subserved by distinct physiological mechanisms. 
The emotions themselves thus constitute at least a preliminary locus of explanatory unification of the 
kind associated with the notion of a drive. This is reflected in psychoanalytic discussions, in which 
emotions are often taken as the mental representatives or expressions of drives. Thus sexual and 
nurturing love are often taken together with such motives as hunger, thirst, and lust as 
representative of the life drives; likewise anger and hate are taken as representatives of aggressive 
drives, envy as a representative of the death drive, and so on. So the question then becomes 
whether once we have explained things by reference to such motives it is possible for us to go still 
further -- whether, beneath the apparent multiplicity of the emotions, there are deeper psychological 
factors, which might also connect with physiology and biology in a deeper way. 
As is well known, Freud first sought such further explanation via the notion of sexuality. According to 
Freud’s early clinical experience psychoanalysis showed that many emotions and motives not 
previously regarded as sexual could be seen to derive from emotions and motives which were sexual, 
at least in an extended sense. In analysis these emotions and motives -- which included love and 
hate, the seeds of erotic love, jealous rivalry, and so forth -- could be traced to early childhood. They 
were apparently first and most powerfully felt in early relations with the parents, particularly those 
which involved feeding and the management of bodily waste; and they involved stimulation of zones 
of the body, including the mouth and anus, which were to be important in later sexual behaviour. 
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These early emotional episodes were the basis of prototypes which influenced feeling and desire 
throughout life. So the apparent multiplicity of human emotions could be seen as unified both by 
their relation to the field of sexuality (and hence to reproduction), and by their history of original 
direction in the family. The notion of a sexual drive, moreover, was already relatively well established, 
since it was accepted that sexuality had far-reaching manifestations which were both psychological 
and physiological, and that these were systematically connected. On the one hand many well known 
and distinctive patterns of motive and activity (those involved in courtship, sexual jealousy, and so 
on) were already taken as sexual; and on the other these apparently stemmed from a physiological 
system which functioned to ensure copulation and hence reproduction. 
So both Freud’s clinical experience and the physiological and Darwinian background of his thinking 
rightly converged on sexuality as a powerful and pervasive source of motivation and a likely 
physiological and biological candidate for a drive (albeit one which worked in a particularly flexible and 
plastic way). Hence in his Three Essays Freud expanded on both the psychological and physiological 
aspects of sexuality simultaneously, and in systematic co-ordination with one another. 
The remarkable diversity which Freud found in the sexual drive -- its variations in aim and object, its 
early division into components linked to various bodily zones, its diphasic onset, and so forth -- all 
served to trace diverse phenomena to components of adult sexuality, and thence to the sexual drive. 
Freud’s thinking on this matter can thus be seen as a paradigm of an attempt to fulfil the explanatory 
requirements latent in the notion of a drive; and so also to put sexual reproduction, as seen in a 
Darwinian perspective, on a footing with other basic psycho-biological processes, which as we have 
seen ramify very widely into human motivation. 
(b) The ego drives and the sexual drive. 
In a Darwinian perspective the ensuring of copulation and reproduction is a biological function which 
is among the most general and basic. The physiological capacities which subserve breathing, eating, 
drinking, and staying warm are in a sense less basic than those which subserve copulation and 
reproduction, for the capacities which enable one to stay alive are understood as having developed, 
and having been preserved in the evolutionary process, just insofar as they enabled creatures, and 
hence their genes, to reproduce themselves. 
This was the basis of Freud’s distinction between ego-drives and the sexual drive. As he puts the idea 
in Drives and their Vicissitudes: ‘Biology teaches that sexuality is not to be put on a par with the 
other functions of the individual; for its purposes go beyond that of the individual and have as their 
content the production of new individuals…[in this perspective] the individual is a temporary and 
transient appendage to the quasi-immortal germ-plasm, which is entrusted to him by the process of 
generation.’ (125) Thus, perhaps paradoxically, eating has both the particular and immediate 
biological function of sustaining life, and also the more general and long-term function of ensuring 
copulation and reproduction; and the last of these, from the perspective of explaining things in terms 
of the way they have evolved, is the most basic function of all. 
For this reason it has been traditional to list the motives which ensure copulation as among those 
connected with the basic needs, even though depriving an animal of the capacity to copulate or 
reproduce may actually be good for its health (eunuchs characteristically live healthier and longer 
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lives than intact males, for example). This sometimes creates confusion, and for clarity in this 
context the word ‘needs’ might be replaced by something like ‘biological imperatives’, where these 
latter would be basic because of the way they sustain reproduction and hence the species rather 
than the way they sustain life in the individual. At the physiological level, however, there is often 
close connection between the systems that deal with bodily needs and those which deal with 
biological imperatives like copulation, which are seemingly less pressing. The evolutionary importance 
of lust and other biological imperatives is shown in the way they are realized together with the 
systems that deal with bodily need, and in the evolutionarily older subcortical areas of the brain. Still, 
because these imperatives are set to be met only over the course of a whole life-cycle, they are 
characteristically also realized in such a way as to permit a degree of flexibility in their operation, 
which Freud particularly stressed in the case of sexuality, and which is not possible for the constant 
basic needs. 
(c) The libidinal drive and the life drive (or drives) 
This in turn enabled Freud to hazard a further unification. Given the central role which he assigned to 
sexuality, he postulated a single drive, the libidinal drive, which was a source of all the activities which 
he had traced to sexuality (or the reproductive drive) in the extended sense he gave it. As we have 
seen, however, there is also a sense in which the reproductive function can be said to encompass all 
others, since all motivational phenomena will owe their evolution ultimately to their role in promoting 
reproduction. And Freud was also inclined to regard all motivational processes -- or at least all those 
which subserved the maintenance and reproduction of life -- as stemming from the a single drive, the 
libidinal or life drive, or Eros. 
Freud hesitated about the postulation of a single life drive, and there is a particularly clear reason for 
doing so. As we have been taking the notion, drives are supposed to be connected with basic desires, 
physiological mechanisms, and biological functions. As we have seen, each physiological organ or 
system of organs will have biological functions which are distinctive (thus the lungs have the function 
of providing Oxygen for the blood, whereas the stomach has that of providing nutrients, and so on). 
Each of these distinctive functions, in turn, will contribute to the overarching functions of maintaining 
and reproducing life. So if we concentrate on these overarching functions, we can always assign the 
most general functions, and hence the same functions, to diverse physiological mechanisms, and to 
mechanisms which are related to diverse desires. 
Thus take drinking water and feeding one’s children. These are distinct activities which apparently 
stem from distinct desires. It would surely be artificial to say that both these activities and the 
desires which prompt them really stem from a more basic desire, namely, a desire to maintain and 
reproduce life. Again, these desires are apparently the products of different physiological systems, 
which have distinct biological functions, which in turn contribute to the overall functions of 
maintaining and reproducing life. So while we can say that drinking and feeding one’s children share a 
general biological function (that of reproduction), they nonetheless remain distinct at the level of 
desire and mechanism. In cases like this we have, on the one hand, some reason for saying that we 
are dealing with one drive (there is a common biological function); and on the other we have a 
number of reasons for saying that we are dealing with distinct drives (there are distinct sets of 
desires, distinct physiological mechanisms, and distinct particular functions). So we would hesitate to 
postulate one drive rather than two drives which shared the general function of reproduction. 
Freud seems to have wanted to postulate a single life drive partly because he saw that very many 
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desires, and hence very many drives, all subserved the overarching functions of sustaining and 
reproducing life. At the same time he was aware that these desires and drives were otherwise 
distinct. Hence he hesitated over the postulation of a single drive, and the same hesitation can be 
observed today. Analysts sometimes speak of the life drive in the singular, and again of life drives in 
the plural, as if unsure whether they are speaking of one drive, or of a number of drives, which work 
to maintain life. We shall return to this question below. 
(d) The brain, homeostasis, and wish-fulfilment. 
The overall conception of a drive which Freud elaborated in the Three Essays had been a constant in 
his thinking from the beginning, and was to remain so until the end; and this conception was itself 
rooted in ideas about the working of the brain. Freud gave these ideas their only fully detailed 
formulation in his Project of 1895. As Freud there puts his conception, 
…the nervous system receives stimuli from the somatic element itself -- endogenous 
stimuli…These have their origin in the cells of the body, and give rise to the major 
needs: hunger, respiration, sexuality….They only cease subject to particular conditions, 
which must be realized in the external world (Cf., for instance, the need for 
nourishment). In order to accomplish such…an effort is required…’ (I, 297). 
  
 
In the case Freud here takes -- that of hunger -- the ‘effort’ required by the endogenous stimuli and 
the basic need they signal is that required to obtain nourishment. Although this requirement is laid 
down in the nervous system, it must be accomplished via the world outside the body; and Freud also 
sketches an account as to how this is brought about. 
Freud conceived the fulfilling of this requirement in terms of what Cannon was in 1929 to call the 
notion of homeostasis, that is, a form of natural maintenance of neural and bodily equilibrium. How 
Freud took this process to work and develop can be seen by considering what he says about the 
hunger drive in the human infant. The internal stimuli which result from a lack of nutrients constitute 
a departure from equilibrium, which is felt as unpleasurable; and the requisite equilibrium can normally 
be restored only by the satisfaction of the need. During restoration, say by feeding, the neural 
pathways activated by the disequilibrating stimuli are perforce linked into a fuller network with those 
activated by the processes through which need is satisfied; and these include the perceptual 
networks active in perception of the external satisfying object, the intermediate networks involved in 
synthesizing information about this, and the networks for generating the motor activities of meeting 
the breast, sucking from it, and so on. The processes which lead to the recovery of neural equilibrium 
are felt as pleasurable, and strengthen neural connections throughout these networks. Thus the 
neural disequilibration caused by unmet need comes to cause the kind of activities through which the 
need is satisfied in the external world, so that such disequilibrim comes to be self-righting. 
This is a basic biological process governed by the working of the brain; but in the course of it the 
drive develops in a specifically psychological way, by acquiring ‘psychic representatives’. The specific 
unpleasure caused by the lack of nutrients gains definition as the feeling of hunger, which is now 
directed on to external objects and situations; and this is also associated with a neural representation 
of the activities connected with eating as providing relief and pleasure, and hence with the range of 
file:///Macintosh%20HD/Desktop%20Folder/Jim's/deathdrive.html%20copy (12 of 22) [23/4/2004 4:01:52 pm]
Project material particles forces of attraction and repulsion
psychological phenomena we relate to the desire to eat. 
The intensity of these psychic representatives, moreover, can be considered as an index of the 
strength of the underlying drive, and hence as ‘a measure of the demand made upon the mind for 
work in consequence of its connection with the body.’ (XIV, 112. Compare VII, 168; XXIII, 148.) And 
note how the ‘effort…required’ to satisfy need in the Project becomes the ‘demand for work’ in the 
later formulations, through to the ‘somatic demands’ in the final formulation in the Outline.) This 
notion of a demand for work, in turn, is related (via the interdefinition of work and energy formulated 
in the 19th century) to that of a quantity of energy, namely the energy required to do the work 
demanded. This, as Freud says, is ‘the conception of neuronal excitation as quantity in a state of 
flow’, which he took as ‘derived directly from pathological clinical observation especially where 
excessively intense ideas were concerned’ such as ‘hysteria and obsessional neurosis’. (I, 296) 
Freud wrote the Project before starting the Interpretation of Dreams, but after he had framed his 
basic idea that both dreams and symptoms were to be understood as wishfulfilments. Hence he 
integrated this fundamental psychoanalytic concept with his homeostatic conception of the drives. 
As we saw, the process of the restoration of equilibrium through the fulfilment of the basic need 
strengthens (or facilitates) the neural pathways involved in fulfilment. This facilitation constitutes the 
laying down of a kind of neural record of the satisfying activities and their physiological 
consequences. This record was then reactivated when the need reasserted itself, and the neural 
image of satisfaction, which was part of this record, was automatically reactivated by the need. This 
image, however, was a part of the network which operated to pacify the drive in the first place; so it 
could now play this role independently of the meeting of the need. 
This pacifying of the original internal drive-stimuli via the neural image of satisfaction -- as opposed 
to real satisfaction itself -- was the process of wishfulfilment, which Freud had discerned in both 
dreams and neurotic and psychotic symptoms. The idea was thus that these symptoms involved the 
overuse of a mechanism by which the brain could pacify the drives in the absence of satisfaction. 
Freud also held that this was the primary process in the pacification of the drives. The whole 
structure of connections depended on the image of satisfaction, and this was the image the helpless 
baby at first most depended on for self-control. There was thus an inbuilt tendency for this image to 
be activated more readily than any other part of the network. This meant that if the image of 
satisfaction was not constantly modified and updated by the sense of reality it was liable to be 
overused, and so to perpetuate both the non-satisfaction of the drive and the pressure from the 
drive which prompted the overuse. This was a neurological version of the vicious circle which Freud 
had already seen in neurosis and psychosis. 
9. Freud’s use of the concept was remarkably correct and prescient, and parallels contemporary 
thinking. 
Freud thus sketched a comprehensive linkage between his notion of a drive and the associated 
notions of need, desire (or psychic representative more generally), homeostasis, and wishfulfilment. 
The way Freud linked these notions is important enough to merit detailed spelling out, but for our 
present purposes, however, the important point is that Freud saw wishfulfilment (and by extension 
such related processes as phantasy) as subserving basic homeostatic functioning. Wishfulfilment 
enables brain to deal with a desire or need or drive which for one reason or another is not now going 
to be satisfied, by pacifying it with a neural representation of the kind of situation in which it would 
be satisfied, felt as real. 
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This made good overall psychological and biological sense. In general, the operation of a desire is shut 
down by our experience of the satisfaction of that desire. Thus for example we stop eating when we 
experience satiation; and this happens well be before the nutrients have been digested and so are 
available to meet the bodily needs which prompted the hunger. There is an evolutionary rationale for 
this. If we felt no relief from the demands of a need until the need was fully met -- if we were nagged 
by hunger, for example, until the required nutrients were actually circulating in the bloodstream -- 
then we would not be able to get on with satisfying other needs even though we had already done all 
that was required to satisfy one. Hence the control of appetite by an experience of satiation which 
operates prior to the actual meeting of need is observed in all except very primitive animals. But once 
this control of desire by satisfying experience is in place, there is the possibility that the neural image 
of such experience can be exploited in the service of further self-control, in the way Freud found to 
occur in us. 
We can now see that Freud’s work on the drives was prescient. As neuroscience has progressed, his 
original conceptions-- as rediscovered and refined by others -- have come to direct research in a way 
which was not possible at the time he wrote. Thus a major recent neuroimaging project on the 
emotions is ‘guided by a theoretical framework that proposes that emotions are part of a multi-
tiered and evolutionarily set neural mechanism aimed at maintaining organismic homeostasis.’ And 
indeed, as this framework requires, the areas of the brain active when persons enter states of 
emotion turn out predominately to involve subcortical regions interwoven with those which direct the 
basic need-fulfilling processes. So the theoretical framework now guiding research in the 
neuroscience of emotion appears in essentials to be that set out by Freud when he first sketched his 
account of the working of the drives. 
This gives hope that the homeostasis-assisting role which Freud assigned to wishfulfilment may now 
be recognized and studied in the natural sciences, as it has been in psychoanalysis. It may also be 
worth noting that something similar holds for evolutionary psychology. Despite the unremitting 
hostility which many evolutionary psychologists show towards psychoanalysis, their focus on 
reproductive competition has led them to find evidence of many unconscious mental processes 
related to sexuality (as well as to competitive aggression); and they are now coming to recognize the 
likely role of mate choice and sexual selection in the evolution of brain and mind. Hence they are 
starting to see human mentality as potentially suffused with features which relate to courtship, 
sexual display, and the like, and so link closely with the reproductive function. To see the mind this 
way is to start to see it as Freud did in the Three Essays, and as it is seen in much subsequent 
psychoanalytic work involving the symbolization of sexual and other biological processes -- although 
from an entirely different vantage point. 
In a Darwinian perspective Freud’s discoveries seem to concern aspects of our minds which we have 
evolved not to acknowledge. Insofar as this is so then we may expect psychoanalysis always to 
encounter a degree of hatred and resistance, as it pushes us towards learning what we are built not 
to know. Still, since research in both neuroscience and evolutionary psychology shows increasing 
consilience with psychoanalysis, the materials for at least starting on the kind of unificatory project 
which Freud intended may be coming to hand. 
10. But Freud’s use of the concept also embodied a radical error, the idea of neural equilibrium at 
zero excitation. This seems to have been taken from work by Helmholtz and Fechner, according to 
which the Second Law of Thermodynamics showed that all things tended to ‘a state of eternal rest’. 
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Still it is important to note that Freud’s conception had serious faults. In particular, while Freud 
thought of the energy connected with the drives as neural excitation (cf. ‘neuronal excitation as 
quantity in a state of flow’ above), he thought of neurons, including those in the brain, as lacking any 
capacity to generate energy or excitation themselves. On his account neurons received energy from 
external sources, and acted to divest themselves of it as rapidly as possible. Hence, as Freud held, 
the whole nervous system had an ‘original trend to inertia’, that is, ‘to bringing the level of [neural 
excitation] to zero’ (I, 296). It is this trend that the ‘endogenous stimuli’ of the drives interrupt, by 
pumping energy into the brain with their ‘demands’ for work or action. So homeostasis as conceived 
in the Project is a process in which brain works to reduce the level of neuronal excitation, ideally to 
nothing. 
This may well have been how things looked in the perspective of the reflex arc, to which Freud refers 
as showing the essence of neural functioning. Also it was an application to neural processes of the 
second law of thermodynamics, as enunciated by Helmholtz, who as we noted was the dominant 
figure in the approach to the natural sciences in which Freud was educated. According to this law 
ordered systems tend in general to dissipate their energy, and hence their order, in transactions of 
mechanical causality, in which the flow of energy runs from states of higher to lower potential 
energy. (The flow of heat, which is always from warmer to cooler, and in which heat is always 
dissipated, provided the paradigm for this account.) Hence things in general tend towards a sort of 
zero state as regards their energy or order, described by Helmholtz for the universe as a whole as ‘a 
state of eternal rest’. 
The was a basic and general claim of the physics of Freud’s time about the flow of energy. Freud was 
probably particularly familiar with it the form of Fechner’s conception of ‘Absolute stability, in which 
there exists no energy or movement in a given system’, since he cites Fechner specifically in his work 
on the death drive. In assuming that neuronal processes worked via energy ‘in a state of flow’ Freud 
naturally made this claim part of his model. So in hypothesizing a zero state as an equilibrium for the 
brain, Freud was extrapolating current scientific views. 
11. This Fechnerian conception misrepresents the thermodynamic nature of organic homeostasis, and 
of living things generally. 
In an important sense, however, this extrapolation yielded the direct opposite of the truth. As we 
now know, far from working to divest itself of energy, the brain works to accumulate and 
concentrate it; and the brain does not simply dissipate this energy, but rather uses it constantly to 
order and maintain the life of the body. Each neuron builds up within its own membrane the electro-
chemical potential which it uses in firing, and so in an important sense manufactures its own energy 
on site. Hence although the brain accounts for just 2% of the weight of the body, it concentrates to 
itself, and then employs, something like 40% of the glucose we bring into ourselves by eating. (This 
shows in the way we are able to create images of the active brain by tracking the blood-borne 
glucose which fuels the neurons as they work.) 
This in turn reflects the nature of life itself. Living systems are always highly ordered, and hence loci 
of potential energy; and they concentrate further energy within themselves, so as to maintain the 
complex order inherent in their parts and the working of their vital processes. Living things thus 
constitute a kind of continuing local defiance of the second law as Helmholtz described it. In a 
thermodynamic perspective life is a sort of eddy in the pool of our biosphere, which collects energy 
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from the sun, and so enables the general trend charted by the second law to be temporarily 
reversed. (The second law holds for closed systems, but the biosphere is an open system with a 
constant influx of energy.) Accordingly living things have come to possess an energic order which 
enables them to create further order by further concentrating energy in themselves, which they use 
to maintain both their individual life-cycles and the processes by which they reproduce and multiply. 
The results of these process are in turn systematically collected and saved via the further ordering 
induced by evolution itself. In this way life has managed to swim here for a time, against the slow 
dissipation of the thermodynamic tide. 
The basic principle which Freud wrote into his account of homeostasis -- the principle of neural 
dissipation of energy, towards equilibrium at zero -- thus reverses the real situation. Instead of seeing 
the brain as creating order, and so working in the opposite direction of the second law, Freud wrote a 
version of the second law into his model of the brain, and so made its disordering direction the 
essence of neural functioning. 
12 The Fechnerian conception figures in Freud’s psychology as the ‘necessary postulate’ that ‘the 
nervous system is an apparatus having the function of abolishing stimuli which reach it, or of 
reducing excitation to the lowest possible state: an apparatus which would, if this were feasible, 
maintain itself in an altogether unstimulated condition.’ (XIV 120). This leads directly to Freud’s idea 
that the aim of life is death. 
In consequence Freud seems to have misconceived the homeostatic working of drives in two ways. 
First, he took drives as the sources of the brain’s energy, and so as interrupting its trend towards 
inertness. Instead, however, they operate via relatively low-energy signals which instruct the brain as 
to how to use the energy already constantly being transformed there. This is a relatively insignificant 
mistake, although marks of it are to be seen in things Freud says about the flow of energy from the 
drives, the libido, and so forth. But secondly, in taking homeostasis to turn solely on the dispersal of 
energy, Freud directly reversed its real ordering and life-sustaining nature. The way he originally set 
up his neural model made it look as though the goal of homeostatic functioning (staying at level 
zero) would really be achieved only when the organism was in its analogue of Helmholtz’s ‘state of 
eternal rest’. This was the underlying thrust of this aspect of Freud’s model, and unfortunately this 
was the direction his thought was subsequently to take. 
Thus in Drives and their Vicissitudes Freud reaffirmed the ‘necessary postulate’ that that ‘the 
nervous system is an apparatus having the function of abolishing stimuli which reach it, or of 
reducing excitation to the lowest possible state: an apparatus which would, if this were feasible, 
maintain itself in an altogether unstimulated condition’ (XIV 120; emphasis supplied). Then in Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle he took a further step. He argued that the compulsion to repeat is to be seen 
as instinctual (a manifestation of a drive) precisely because it is an instance of ‘an urge inherent in 
organic things to restore an earlier state of things which the living entity has been obliged to 
abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces.’ (XVIII, 36; Freud’s emphasis) This again is 
a characterization of drives as working to maintain an equilibrium, where this is conceived as re-
establishing a state of low active internal energy (an ‘unstimulated condition’) after the 
disequilibrating input of energy from outside (‘external disturbing forces’). But if this is what drives 
do then their working will tend towards a state in which there is no active internal energy at all, that 
is, the state of inorganic things. So finally, and after so many years, we see Freud drawing the 
conclusion latent in his use of equilibrium at zero in the Project. He argues that the ultimate goal of 
drives as such is ‘an initial state from which the living entity has at one time or another departed and 
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to which it is striving to return’: that ‘the aim of all life is death’ (XVIII, 38). 
The idea that Freud’s reasoning here turns on his Fechnerian conception of homeostasis at zero is 
made clearer in other statements. Thus later he says that ‘It will be remembered that we have taken 
the view that the principle which governs all mental processes is a special case of Fechner’s 
‘tendency towards stability’ [see above], and have accordingly attributed to the mental apparatus 
the purpose of reducing to nothing, or at least keeping as low as possible, the sums of excitation 
which flow in upon it.’ (XIX 159). Hence, as he says, ‘If it is true that Fechner’s principle of constancy 
governs life, which thus consists of a continuous descent towards death, it is the claims of Eros, of 
the sexual instincts, which, in the form of instinctual needs, hold up the falling level and introduce 
fresh tensions.’ (XIX, 47; emphasis supplied) Since the instinctual needs hold up the falling level of 
tension in the nervous system, the ‘principle of constancy’ is the homeostatic tendency there, which 
otherwise constitutes ‘a continuous descent towards death.’ 
13. Since this conception is based on error and biologically unsustainable it should be rejected. 
Thus, ironically, Freud completed his far-sighted and pioneering attempt to unite psychoanalysis with 
biology and the other natural sciences by framing an account of the drives which was inconsistent 
with the most solid and fundamental aspects of the sciences with which he hoped to unify. In 
particular, his idea of a drive which works against life and to foster death is contradicted by the basic 
and thoroughly substantiated claim that biological evolution occurs via the successful reproduction of 
life, and therefore works to save and maintain structures only insofar as they subserve this function. 
This has long been a guiding idea of biological research, and so far nothing has been found to 
contradict it. Spandrels there may be, but they are evidently spandrels in the cathedral built by the 
working of natural selection. Science is tentative in its nature; but this is not a tentative part of 
science. 
So it seems worth stressing that in scientific terms Freud’s Fechnerian notion of a death drive, as 
formulated in these passages -- the drive as the servant of homeostasis at degree zero, and so as 
tending towards death -- is based on a mistake, and itself mistaken. It is of course always possible, 
particularly with Freud, that an idea which now seems mistaken may yet harbour some insight which 
will turn out to be valid as against present science. There is no reason to think this here. For we can 
see the origin of Freud’s error quite clearly, in the ideas from the physical sciences which he explicitly 
wrote into the Project and then consistently maintained from that time on. So Freud’s thinking on 
this particular head should just be rejected; as indeed many analysts, from Ernest Jones on, have 
rejected it. 
With this in mind, let us look briefly at Freud’s final formulation of the dialectic of the drives. 
….[it is] possible to distinguish an indeterminate number of drives, and in 
common practice this is in fact done. For us, however, the important question 
arises whether it might not be possible to trace all these numerous drives back 
to a few basic ones…After long hesitations and vacillations we have decided to 
assume the existence of only two basic drives, Eros and the destructive 
drive…[whose] final aim is to lead what is living into an inorganic state…In 
biological functions the two basic drives act against one another or combine with 
one another. Thus, the act of eating is a destruction of the object with the final 
aim of incorporating it, and the sexual act is an act of aggression with the 
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purpose of the most intimate union. This concurrent and mutually opposing 
action of the two basic drives gives rise to the whole variegation of the 
phenomena of life. The analogy of our two basic drives extends from the sphere 
of living things to the pair of opposing forces -- attraction and repulsion -- which 
rule in the inorganic world. (XXIII, 149)
Two points about this Fechnerian conception, noted at the outset, are worth remarking here. The 
first is the clear evidence of Freud’s intention to unite psychoanalysis with the natural sciences. 
Indeed his final sentence, in which he compares the life and death drives to ‘the pair of opposing 
forces -- attraction and repulsion -- which rule in the inorganic world’ seems almost deliberately to 
echo the challenge of the Helmholtz school quoted above, to explain everything by chemical-physical 
forces, or ‘to assume new forces equal in dignity to [those of]…. attraction and repulsion’. 
Accordingly Freud’s life and death drives subserve biological functions which hold for everything that 
lives. The death drive is ‘inherent in organic life’ (see the previous quote), and so acts in everything 
which may be led ‘into an inorganic state’. On this account even the flowers wither because of the 
death drive within; and this puts the Fechnerian conception far beyond support which could be 
gathered from the observation of human beings alone. 
Secondly, and in accord with this, Freud does not claim empirical support for the notion. Rather he 
treats this matter as one which is the subject of hesitant and vacillating postulation. The drives, as 
he says, are 
….nebulous, scarcely imaginable conceptions, which [psychoanalysis] hopes to 
apprehend more clearly in the course of its development, or which it is even 
prepared to replace by others. For these ideas are not the basis of the science 
upon which everything rests: that, on the contrary, is observation alone. They 
are not the foundation-stone but the coping of the whole structure, and they 
can be replaced or discarded without damaging it. (XIV, 77; Brill’s translation.)
It seems clear, using Freud’s metaphor, that the particular Fechnerian coping which he fashioned 
requires to be replaced. As already indicated (section 9 above), the specifications of his original plans 
have recently been executed by others, and using the latest technology. So if we are interested in 
continuing Freud’s project new materials are at hand, which have the right form. Before considering 
these, however, we should review some other aspects of Freud’s and later thinking about the drives. 
14. Although Freud’s Fechnerian conception of the death drive cannot be justified by clinical 
evidence, he can also be regarded as having a distinct clinical conception; and this has been 
legitimately extended in post-Freudian work. 
Although Freud’s biological conception cannot be supported clinically, he nonetheless held it on partly 
clinical grounds. When he later wrote that the idea of a death drive had ‘gained such a hold on me 
that I can no longer think in any other way’ what described was ‘an inclination to aggression [which] 
is an original, self-subsisting instinctual disposition in man.’ (XXI, 122) This was a ‘drive of 
aggressiveness and destructiveness’ which also showed itself in ‘self destruction’, and which seemed 
required to explain ‘the ubiquity of non-erotic aggressivity and destructiveness’ disclosed by 
psychoanalysis and common observation. (XXI, 119-20). This destructiveness was notably employed 
against the self, for the super-ego which ‘rages against the ego with merciless violence’ embodies ‘a 
pure culture of the death drive’, which may actually lead to self-killing. (XIX, 53). 
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We can usefully regard this as a purely clinical conception of the death drive -- that is, a conception 
of the drive as unifying this range of clinically observable phenomena -- and separate it off from the 
Fechnerian conception considered above. It was this clinical conception which was developed by 
Melanie Klein and her co-workers. Klein took the aggressivity which she found manifested in the 
analysis of children to spring from an original destructiveness which was also directed against the 
self, and which, in a projected from, animated the super-ego. And of course she considered this 
aggression to be earlier and more ferocious than even Freud had envisaged. As she wrote: 
The idea of an infant of from six to twelve months trying to destroy its mother by 
every method at the disposal of its sadistic trends -- with its teeth, nails, and excreta 
and with the whole of its body, transformed into dangerous weapons -- presents a 
horrifying, not to say unbelievable, picture to our minds. And it is difficult, as I know 
from my own experience, to bring oneself to recognize that such an abhorrent idea 
answers to the truth. But the abundance, force, and multiplicity of the cruel phantasies 
which accompany these cravings are displayed before our eyes in early analyses so 
clearly and forcibly that they leave no room for doubt.
Speaking schematically, we can say that both Freud’s and Klein’s clinical conception was of the death 
drive as a form of aggression, paradigmatically expressed in the emotion of rage, and capable of 
being directed against the self. And we can see Kleinian (and other post-Freudian) work on the death 
drive as seeking to unify manifestations of aggression of this kind. This is both clinically and 
biologically supportable, for aggression in general has a clear evolutionary function, and the way it is 
directed against the self in our species seems also to have a further function in self- and social 
regulation. This is, indeed, explicit in the way Freud and Klein both link this aggression with the super-
ego; for the Freudian super-ego -- whose optimal expression is in the properly regulative moral 
conscience -- is an organ both of individual self-control and group functioning. (The same holds for 
internal objects generally. The dialectic of projection and introjection by which they are established is 
that which in effect creates a regulative internal map of the familial and social world.) 
In Darwinian terms, then, we can see Klein and her successors as investigating the working of a very 
powerful form of aggression which is used in human self-regulation and self-control, and which, 
accordingly, seems from early in life to be directed towards one’s own self. This has involved charting 
many ways in things can go wrong in the development and direction of such aggression. As is 
familiar, the list (taking now the individual level only) includes not only suicide and self-wounding, but 
also various kinds of valorization of death, death, deadliness, and annihilation, and the ruthless 
attacking from within of one’s most basic capacities to experience, think, and know. (These latter 
might of course also originate in hatred of the external situation which might be experienced or 
thought about.) 
Such phenomena seem to have a range and variety partly comparable to those through which 
sexuality expresses itself. Some might be regarded as perversions of the use of aggression in 
regulating the self, while others seem to reflect deeper developmental failures, and so are more 
primitive and destructive. This pattern is consistent with the idea that Kleinian investigations have 
started to unify these phenomena in something like the way Freud sought to unify those relating to 
sexuality. (And this might be so even if these phenomena are less striking and pervasive than those 
of sexuality, and their derivation from a single source less clearly marked. This would be because 
aggression directed towards the self, however important in our species, still does not play the 
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biologically commanding role of the reproductive drive itself.) 
15. Accepting this role for the drive, however, entails regarding it as a particular form of aggression, 
and hence in terms of one among a number of drives or emotions which all seem basic. This is 
supported by reflection on the realization of emotion in the brain. 
This line of thought suggests that post-Freudian work on the death drive both has real connections 
with Freud’s original conception, and also makes an explanatory contribution which is independent of 
any error which that conception contains. (Whether this gives intellectual as opposed to historical 
reason for continuing to use the Freud’s terminology is another matter. In abandoning Fechner and 
seeing the kind of aggression with which we are concerned as having an evolutionary function we 
cease to regard it as a death drive in Freud’s original sense, that is, a drive whose function is to 
promote death; but the term itself still carries the implication of this biological version of the flat 
earth.) But on this account the drive itself no longer enjoys its former status. It is no longer one of 
the two great forces, whose interaction determines the whole variegation of psychological nature. 
Rather it is a particular form of aggression, and so apparently just one aspect, albeit a very important 
one, of the working of aggression in general (or, if we like, of the general working of the aggressive 
drive). 
Aggression seems to have a special role in human self-regulation, and hence in the internal conflicts 
of human beings. Psychoanalysis indicates that these connected features -- conflict and failures in 
self-regulation -- are central to many kinds of psychpathology, and hence to psychoanalytic accounts 
of what goes wrong with people. Considered apart from this special role, however, aggression seems 
to be be just one of a range of basic emotions, no one of which (the evolutionary priority of sexuality 
aside) seems much more basic than the others. Thus aggression seems distinct from fear, for 
example, and in general terms scarcely more fundamental than it; and the two seem often to be in 
conflict, as when the alternatives are fight or flight. This is borne out, furthermore, by the realization 
of these motives in the brain. We noted above that many neuroscientists now take the basics of 
emotion to be realized together with the mechanisms which govern the securing of bodily needs, just 
as Freud’s did in his account of ‘the major needs: hunger, respiration, sexuality…’ which inspired his 
theory of drives. Thus the subcortical regions of the brain pivotal to homeostasis also include 
‘emotion induction zones’ in which the stimulation of distinct sets of neural circuits causes the onset 
of distinct emotions, such as those of lust, rage, fear, distress at separation, engagement of 
maternal nurturance, play, and probably a range of others; and the pattern thus set in motion 
characteristically includes basics of the behaviours by which the associated emotions are 
consummated. 
Thus stimulation of the rage circuitry will cause an animal to threaten or attack, and to undergo the 
physiological changes involved in doing so, in the ways characteristic of its particular species. (One 
can stimulate rage of this kind in cats who have had their cerebral cortices entirely removed.) 
Something similar holds for fear; and the complementations and oppositions between these emotions 
are shown in the way that the circuits for the one can both activate and inhibit those for the other. 
This also seems to be the most basic level for understanding motives of these kinds. For on the one 
hand there is no clear level below these subcortical induction regions at which coherent motivation 
can be induced; and on the other it seems that these basic circuits are linked with perception and 
orchestrated by the higher cortical regions to provide the complex and cognitively rich emotions 
which we find in human life. In this perspective aggression and fear form, as it were, one interacting 
pair in the overall ensemble of emotion. In this ensemble each basic emotion (or drive) has a distinct 
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role of its own, and taking one or two of them as somehow the sole and ultimate root of things 
seems, on the face of it, a misleading simplification. 
16. Contemporary accounts of the neural realization of basic needs and emotions have striking 
parallels with Freud’s account of the drives. 
This raises again the question as to what the basic drives or emotions are, and how many of them 
actually operate. This is the same question as: from how many distinct roots does the ‘vast 
variegation’ of human mental life ultimately stem? Is there just one root, as talk of ‘the life drive’ 
might be taken to suggest? Or are there just two, as Freud held, and we have been putting in 
question? Or are there as many roots are there are distinct subcortical circuits for needs and 
emotional patterns, so that human motivation is more like a grove growing from a multiplicity of 
distinct roots than like a single oak, or an oak being strangled by mistletoe? 
As we have been noting, recent work in neuroscience has many parallels with Freud’s thinking about 
the drives. Roughly, Freud thought of drives as the fundamental motive-producing processes, and 
took their working as bound up with homeostasis. Neuroscientists like Damasio and Panksepp take 
emotions to be fundamental motive-producing processes, and link them with homeostasis in a way 
which is comparable. Freud thought of a variety of needs as subserved by a single libidinal drive, and 
as Solms has stressed, there is also a neuroscientific parallel to this. The various needs, and aspects 
of emotion, secure their objects through the arousal of a general-purpose motivational system, which 
Panksepp calls the seeking system. This arousal of this general appetitive system moves us to seek 
whatever we want or need, with as it were a single form of excitation; so that its working has a kind 
of correspondence to Freud’s single libidinal drive. Finally, Freud thought that the drives could be 
pacified by wishfulfilment in dreams or symptoms; and Solms has given strong reasons for holding 
that dreaming depends on the arousal of the seeking system, which is also thought to be implicated 
in schizophrenia, various kinds of delusion, etc. Basic needs and emotions in their relations to the 
seeking system, as studied by these neuroscientists, thus occupy the same overall place in 
physiology and psychology as the drives Freud hypothesized. This makes these basic needs and 
emotions good candidates for the real things Freud was discussing in his consideration of drives. 
17. And their compatibility with psychoanalytic accounts becomes clearer when we consider how 
such basic emotions might be combined, co-ordinated, and controlled by the complex systems of 
representation and cognition which have developed in our species. 
It is also very intelligible that the basic emotions studied by neuroscience should be something like 
ingredients of others, and in particular of those studied in psychoanalysis. Thus take Klein’s 
description of infantile rage quoted above. The idea that such rage can be triggered so early, and is 
so early (or innately) connected with the destructive use of the body, has struck many as incredible. 
But in fact this seems what one might expect, given the innate and automatic circuitry for rage in the 
mammalian brain. Since this circuitry can govern expressions of rage with little or no cortical 
assistance, one might well expect it to be active from very early in life, and in response to a great 
variety of discomforts and frustrations; and this seems to be what we observe. Again, its operation 
would from the beginning involve the body, and this in what was to develop into, and might already 
be felt as, a very destructive way. Infantile rage at another’s possession of something desirable might 
be an important part of a kind of infantile destructive envy; and what started as infantile rage might 
become a more constant hatred when integrated with a representation of an object such as to 
permanently enraging. Likewise, although rage and fear are distinct, something which regularly 
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caused the discomfort of envy or fear could likewise become an object of rage and thence hatred on 
that account; and so on. 
Again, one would expect the circuitry for rage or other basic emotions to come into more and more 
complex interrelations, and so to constitute forms of homeostatic self-regulation, as the infant’s 
system of representation developed. Thus as the infant came to understand its mother as the cause 
of both enraging frustrations and gratifying satisfactions, this might lead to emotional development. 
The raging infant might, for example, imagine that it had destroyed its mother, and this in turn might 
activate the innate circuitry for distress at loss of contact with the mother, and the depression which 
characteristically follows on this. This in turn might lead the infant to mitigate its rage on further 
occasions; and so on. Thus we might find that the development of cortical control of rage and other 
basic emotions, as hypothesized by neuroscientists, was bound up with such phenomena as the 
depressive position, as described by analysts. The two perspectives seem potentially compatible and 
complementary. 
18. Finally the case of play suggests that consideration of neuroscientific accounts might enrich 
psychoanalytic ones. 
Finally, it is a striking feature of the neuroscientific inventory of basic emotions that it is considerably 
richer than the psychoanalytic theory of drives. This suggests that attention to this framework may 
prove useful for considering clinical phenomena in ways the present psychoanalytic framework does 
not. It seems particularly striking, for example, that in almost all mammals there are distinct neural 
circuits which govern play. The mother-child or parent-infant relation often consists largely in play, 
which is interwoven with feeding; and play requires (and manifests) an absence of emotions such as 
rage and fear. This suggests that we can take play -- or such likely adult versions of it as recreation, 
humour, and laughter -- as issuing from a distinct drive, which is on a par with rage and fear, but 
which operates in opposition to these emotions. 
Now of course play has long been of great importance to psychoanalysis, and psychoanalysis has 
studied play and linked it with other phenomena as no other psychology has done. Among other 
things analysts have attended its role in the development of the child, in child analysis, and to its 
relations to dream, phantasy, symbolism, and art. Still it seems that play might have been 
understood differently, and perhaps more thoroughly, had the pioneers of child analysis thought of it 
as stemming from a drive of its own, which was systematically related to others. Child analysts 
frequently remark on the importance of the child starting to play again, of its play developing in this 
way or that, and so on; and adult analysts often note the importance of the patient being able to 
relax about something, or to laugh about something or appreciate the humour of it. In focusing on 
these things we seem to be focusing on manifestations of play, and marking their importance by the 
role which we assign them, but in a relatively unsystematic way. This suggests that there is 
something further to be unified here, which we might better do if we took these phenomena as 
marking the engagement of particular drive or motivational system. If play or recreation or humour 
do stem from a distinct drive, then this should give rise to a family of manifestations related to it and 
thereby to one another; and the only psychology which might unify this family is psychoanalysis. 
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